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SMALL STATE SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN
POST-ARAB SPRING MENA: THE CASE OF THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
MATTHEW HEDGES
Matthew Hedges has recently completed a doctorate at Durham University
on the Regime Security Strategy of the United Arab Emirates. His first
book, Reinventing the Sheikhdom: Clan, Power and Patronage in the UAE,
will be published later this year by Hurst. He addressed the RSAA on
the subject of Patronage Networks of the Arabian Peninsula on 17
March 2021. Email: matthew.j.hedges@durham.ac.uk
Introduction
The Arab Spring critically altered the nature and perceptions of potential
threats across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The rise to pol-
itical prominence of non-state actors fundamentally challenged traditional
and predominantly authoritarian forms of governance that had previously
dominated the region. Some MENA states were as a result thrust into civil
wars and violent transitions of power, while others were only marginally
affected. This trend is especially evident within Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, which
witnessed significant unrest. Others, such as Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), remained largely unaffected. Doha saw the Arab
Spring as a prime opportunity to increase its influence and construct
new narratives about itself in the region. However, other GCC states
only saw threats in the situation. As a result, there have been contrasting
foreign policy strategies among these various states ever since.
It has been necessary for the smaller littoral GCC states of Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to practise what Nye describes as ‘smart
diplomacy’. These states are using both hard and soft power to circumvent
potential threats.1 The need to practise such a strategy is occasioned by
these states’ small populations and land masses, fragile social dynamics,
illiberal governance structures, as well as the unstable nature of the
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region and inter-regional rivalry. The region is however supported by vast
natural resources that have allowed the economic and societal develop-
ment of these states whilst also financing foreign relations strategies that
have helped cultivate advantageous foreign ties. Since the First Gulf
War, the GCC states have been firmly aligned with the US and European
states. However, the smaller GCC states have gradually diversified security
cooperation and assistance relationships, a process which was somewhat
accelerated under the Obama presidency.
The diversification of foreign relations is a critical aspect of the foreign policy
dynamics of small states, with Ulrichsen observing that “for small states
seeking to best leverage their limited political, economic and strategic
assets, it made rational sense to increase their importance to as many powerful
external partners as possible”.2 Small states are therefore required to balance an
array of strategies that can augment present and future relationships. This
approach has prompted an exploration of broader foreign ties away from
the GCC states’ traditional allies in the West to include China, India, and
Russia. By balancing foreign relations, the GCC states can avoid a depen-
dence on specific relationships and thus further enhance their independence.
While foreign policy strategies can be analysed through their application, it
is difficult to examine critically the policies of GCC states on account of
their architecture of power and condensed decision-making structure.
The mechanisms of foreign policy that are exercised by bureaucrats, com-
mittees and resolutions are subtle, guarded, and limited to counsel and sug-
gestion. For this reason, it is critical that an assessment of the foreign
relations of GCC states engages both with states and individual actors.
However, this is complicated as the GCC states have, through the post-
Arab Spring period, increasingly deployed foreign relations strategies
indirectly through proxies. This has helped to augment their limited
resources and conceal attribution for sensitive portfolios. Examples can
include the recruitment of private military companies (PMCs), private
investments by ruling family members, or the employment of trusted
and well-connected individuals who can select foreign policy strategies
and assist their amplification. A consideration of individual actors also
focuses attention on the cultural norms and customs within which they
work, that also legitimise the same traditional and cultural values that
support the position of the region’s monarchs.
The socio-cultural grounding of diplomatic practices among the GCC
states forms an important aspect of their foreign relations. Originating
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from the GCC states’ tribal nature and regulated power structures, the way
in which international relations is practically implemented mirrors many
of the region’s societal characteristics: a combination of formal eti-
quette-led engagement with a growing plethora of informal mediums
and channels that enhance political engagement. As a result, channels of
formal and indirect engagement can be evidence of evidence equally sig-
nificant manifestations of foreign policy. This article looks at how such
engagements impact on foreign policy, with particular regard to the secur-
ity sector.
GCC post-Arab spring security-focused foreign policy
The clearest area of heightened foreign policy engagement by the GCC
states has been within the security domain. This has been a direct result
of the Arab Spring, generational leadership changes, and evolving
foreign relations with traditional allies. The security-focused foreign pol-
icies of the GCC states have primarily developed on two fronts: through
their armed forces and personnel connections or proxies.
The GCC’s security forces hold a prominent position as a result of the
image the institutions project within their societies. While historically
the GCC Armed Forces were only used domestically or for peacekeeping
operations, since 2011 there has been a significant increase in combat
operations by the GCC states. Qatar led regional efforts to remove Presi-
dent Ghaddafi and President Assad from power in Libya and Syria respect-
ively, while Saudi Arabia has directed a war in Yemen to remove the
Houthis from Sana’a. The UAE also has significantly increased its overseas
operations, engaging adversaries from Mali to Somalia, and often in con-
junction with strategic foreign partners.
While in the economic and commercial spheres informal foreign relations
can commonly be seen through the involvement of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and family-owned holding companies, similar practices
within the realm of security are often conducted through personnel lin-
kages. This field has witnessed blossoming relationships occurring
between the region’s politically relevant elites (PREs), non-state actors,
and commercial agents and their foreign counterparts. Engagements
have occurred between states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
non-state actors, private companies, and community groups. Particularly
common are operations through ruling family members and their
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commercial entities that manage and direct private-partnerships within the
security field.
On account of the heightened sensitivity of security policies within the
GCC, the political-military system demands a tight control of policy
and strategy. This being the case, the fostering of interpersonal relation-
ships ends up contributing to and impacting on sensitive portfolios, aug-
menting capability and policy implementation, thanks largely to the
aura of ambiguity and privacy which surrounds the relationships. Like-
wise, to ensure political acquiesce, elite figures personally manage strategic
relationships with foreign personnel. The most prominent example of this
was the former Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan bin Abdula-
ziz al Saud, and his direct management of the Kingdom’s strategy in
Yemen. However, this article will focus on the case study of the UAE
to examine how strategic interactions have developed.
Beyond the GCC states’ collective alliances with the US and EU states,
the post-Arab Spring era has seen diverging foreign policy strategies
among the GCC states. Regardless of their ideological motivations,
the three most proactive GCC states, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE, all have experienced leadership changes since the start of the
Arab Spring. There have also been significant leadership changes
within the US, UK, and France during this period. This may offer
an explanation why, through an actor-level foreign policy analysis,
the GCC’s relationship between those said countries has been turbulent
since 2011.
The instability of the traditionally strong foreign relations of the GCC
states with Western nations has been accompanied by the development
of a proliferation of pragmatic ties with an increasing array of states and
non-state actors. While no state can currently offer a substitute for the
US’s guarantee of security within the Persian Gulf, many new relation-
ships have appeared which are strategically enhancing the GCC’s capa-
bilities in place of the traditional Western assistance.
The increasing number of combat engagements of the GCC states after
the Arab Spring has signalled a new era of MENA foreign relations.
With small militaries, the GCC’s small states have more commonly
engaged in proxy security engagement across MENA. However, the
UAE bucks this trend by directly engaging in overseas security oper-
ations. As the region’s most proactive state in security engagements,
the UAE presents a unique example to illustrate how the security
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engagement of GCC states has evolved within MENA since the Arab
Spring.
The United Arab Emirates
The UAE has been shown to understand, value, and prioritise social sub-
systems when engaging in foreign relations. This article argues that the
UAE interprets and uses a strategy that acknowledges and exploits multiple
sources of authority and legitimacy, formally and informally within
MENA societies in order to amplify its engagement. The in general
UAE views “society as a mélange of social organisations rather than a
dichotomous structure,”3 and therefore it appreciates the multitude of
ideological, sectarian, corporate, tribal or kinship groups that divide
MENA society.
The UAE’s adoption of such a ‘state-in-society’ approach to foreign
relations should be understood in terms of two fundamental factors:
firstly, the UAE itself is a federal state whose powers and societal groups
are fragmented, and secondly, on account of the source of power in the
national ultimately being concentrated within a single tribe, there is a
general appreciation within the country for informal linkages to support
policy engagement.
Due to the delegation of legal powers within the UAE, there are compet-
ing approaches to foreign policy, and varying actions made by different
centres of power within the state. This was most publicly observed in
the first Gulf War where Abu Dhabi and Dubai came to different con-
clusions about the threats posed by the situation. More recently,
however, foreign policy priorities and preferences have split the state to
the extent that different parties have conflicting strategies that are at
direct odds with each other. The Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah all hold different positions towards Iran.
Nonetheless, as the capital Emirate, Abu Dhabi is responsible for directing
the state’s policy and strategy. Although the 2009 financial crash acceler-
ated the UAE’s transition from a federally administered state to acting in a
more unified nation, differences between the UAE’s two largest Emirates
have continued.4 While there are still federal positions held by non-Abu
Dhabi elites, most of these are within non-structural entities e.g. while
the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan, the Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs and Minister of State for International Cooperation both originate
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from Dubai, and in contrast to Sheikh Abdullah, are not royal family
members but derive from prominent family clans.5 This delegation of
authority supports the UAE’s federal identity but clearly circumvent
Abu Dhabi’s clear priority over security-focused initiatives.
An understanding of how powers were historically allocated within the
UAE and the way in which they have been concentrated lends support
to this article’s notion that the UAE operates a ‘state-in-society’ foreign
policy model. It is further supported by an examination of the role of
the UAE within MENA particularly within the domain of defence and
security, sectors which have traditionally been directed from Abu Dhabi.
The UAE’s Foreign Policy is, according to Hellyer, driven by a unified
ideological and belief system.6 He identifies four principal priorities
within it:
(1) Security of the Arabian Gulf
(2) Close ties with the other states on the Arabian Peninsula
(3) Heightened engagement with MENA states
(4) Enhanced co-operation with the Islamic World
While this categorisation is over simplified and entirely disregards the
UAE’s engagement with the non-Islamic world, Hellyer does highlight
the perception of how strongly the UAE prioritises its immediate regional
engagement.
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the UAE has firmly aligned
itself with the West and has become a leading and active opponent of
violent and non-violent extremism within MENA. Examples of the
UAE’s counter-terrorism and security cooperation include the establish-
ment of the Abu Dhabi based Hedayah Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) centre7 in line with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, the
launch of the Sawab Centre to counter Daesh propaganda and discourse,8
and the fact that the UAE became the first MENA state formally to
promote counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU’s police forces.9
There is a general belief that the UAE has prioritised the employment
of hard power over soft power; one which while correct, is heavily
simplified.
The UAE was not always perceived as a close security partner of the West.
In particular, two of the 9/11 hijackers were of Emirati nationality, and
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the second eldest son of Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh Sultan, was reprimanded
for his extreme views. The UAEwas also one of three states to have recog-
nised the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan before rescind-
ing its recognition on 22 September 2001. It even hosted Osama bin
Laden for medical treatment shortly before the attacks in the US. Here,
scepticism towards Abu Dhabi climaxed in 2006 when Dubai Port (DP)
World purchased a port management business on mainland America.
The purchase led to a great deal of concern in the US, and ultimately
DP World was forced to sell its share after its management came under
heavy scrutiny within the public domain. Since then, the UAE has mas-
terfully learnt to align its political strategy with international discourse
and sentiment over prevailing issues. Their sophisticated alignment of
interests and action have been used to legitimise Abu Dhabi’s behaviour
across the MENA.
The UAE’s regional security-led engagement accelerated with the out-
break of the Arab Spring. During this period, Abu Dhabi has maintained
its MENA policy direction of countering terrorism and extremism by
implementing numerous hard and soft power tactics in Egypt, Iraq,
Libya, Palestine, Qatar, and Yemen. While its historical disagreements
with Doha may be noted, Abu Dhabi’s wider engagement across
MENA is of especial interest, as the linkages exploited for political lever-
age are not dependent on asabiya (blood ties) but rather on ideological
grounding and dogmatic application.
UAE post-Arab spring security engagement
At the 2017 United Nations General Assembly, the UAE Minister of
Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Sheikh Abdullah bin
Zayed al Nahyan highlighted Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia as the
key areas of security engagement in which the UAE believes political
and security can be more easily achieved.10 The UAE’s is proactive in
all of these theatres. However, this article will examine Abu Dhabi’s
engagement in Libya, Somalia, and Yemen in more depth to argue that
it is within these areas the UAE’s engagement strategy is more pro-
nounced. Consistent across all three environments is the UAE’s pursuit
of countering violent extremism and political Islam, and the fostering
and development of political-military ties.
SMALL STATE SECURITY: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 7
Libya
The UAE joined NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya in
March 2011 and was a key regional partner in NATO’s air campaign
against Ghaddafi.11 The UAE contributed air combat fighters and actively
participated in the aerial blockade of Libya crucially learning how to effec-
tively cooperate and engage in multi-national coalitions, a lesson which
has enabled them to further enhance their overseas military operations.
After Ghaddafi’s removal from power, the UAE’s operations in Libya
focused on the former Libyan military commander, General Haftar.
While at first Abu Dhabi’s ties to Haftar were discreet, the growing
relationship between the UAE, Egypt, and Russia created an unofficial
coalition which secured a conduit of financial, political and military assist-
ance. While the post-Ghaddafi Libya was descending into chaos with a
multitude of violent extremists emerging across the political spectrum,
the UAE’s strong relationship with a former Ghaddafi General, and one
who worked closely with the US, angered many opponents and resultantly
made the UAE a prominent target within Libya.
In the 2014 escalation of violence, the UAE and Saudi Arabia launched
bombing sorties upon Tripoli in a series of operations which stunned
the international community not only for their success – at least in their
immediate execution – but also because they were willing to engage in
such missions.12 As the operations failed to stop Islamist militants from
taking Tripoli, the UAE embassy (along with the Egyptian embassy)
was targeted in a series of suicide bombings.13
Having formed a strong alliance between Abu Dhabi and Cairo, the UAE
worked with France and Italy to engage in cross border attacks into
Eastern Libya, where bombing sorties occurred. The increased presence
of Western forces in Libya has slowly legitimised the role of Haftar in
Libyan politics, and that of the UAE’s foreign policy there. The fostering
of informal ties went beyond Haftar with the former UN Envoy to Libya
Bernardino Leon moving from his role to become dean of the Emirates
Diplomatic Academy.14 The co-option of leading political figures into
the Emirati domain has provided a long term platform from which to
exert influence for extended periods. This has been mirrored with other
states.15
The combination of informal political-military ties and operational
engagements within Libya has furthered the UAE’s Libya foreign
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policy. Working closely with Moscow and Cairo, Abu Dhabi has co-
opted Haftar and an increasingly wide array of non-state actors to move
Libya towards a potential political settlement and defeat the violent extre-
mists that have exploited the post-civil war chaos, and who are now
within the UN-recognised government.
General Haftar’s forces were able to gain an upper hand for a short period
of time before a retreat was called on the attempt to capture Tripoli. Since
then, Libya has become the theatre for a proxy conflict between the UAE
and Turkey, in which maximum pressure is being applied by the UAE,
Russia and France in an attempt to halt Turkish expansionism in Africa.
Nevertheless, the UAE has slowed its direct support for General Haftar,
instead preferring to allow the conflict to continue at a lower intensity
and at a lower cost. The UAE’s involvement in Libya is a clear example
of the implementation of its strategy, applying direct as well as indirect
foreign support.
Somalia
The UAE’s foreign policy towards Somalia has been packaged as a secur-
ity-focused initiative. However, the implementation of multiple strategic
endeavours suggests far wider aspirations. The varied channels of Emirati
engagement in Somalia showcase a unique public-private political-mili-
tary strategy that demonstrates the full array of tools at the UAE’s disposal.
The UAE’s primary motivation for engagement in Somalia was to secure
international shipping routes. The threats against them emanating from
this quarter were endangering one of the core pillars of the UAE’s
economy, maritime trade. On account of Somalia’s strategic location in
the Horn of Africa and at the Bab al Mandeb chokepoint, piracy within
this area was causing great levels of disturbance. The spike in pirate
attacks from 2006 onwards led to cost increases of between 8 and 13
per cent on all shipping, and was heavily impacting the UAE’s predomi-
nant port operator, DP World.16 While this primarily impacted the
Emirate of Dubai, given the considerable value of the company to the
UAE the commercial success of DP World was also of prime concern
to Abu Dhabi.
As the UAE’s trade and commerce hub, the Emirate of Dubai has been
key in orchestrating initiatives to combat piracy. DP World has been
central to this and has acted as a key public–private partner for the UAE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to augment its implementation of
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foreign policy towards Somalia. This climaxed in 2010–2014 when UAE
MOFA and DP World jointly held several annual conferences to discuss
and rally support for causes that were aimed at countering piracy off
Somalia.17 While these conferences only generated minimal immediate
tangible results, the UAE’s hosting of such events ensured it became the
location for future diplomatic engagements within Somalia.
While the international community’s military strategy in Somalia was pre-
dominantly sea-based, the UAE looked to combine its political engage-
ment with a ground-based military strategy. The implementation of this
strategy however was executed through private military contractors
(PMCs) Sterling Corporate Services18 and Erik Prince’s Blackwater suc-
cessor Academi [sic]. This however ended poorly after salaries were not
paid and foreign trainers were killed by Somali troops.
The development of ground-based capabilities was initially fixed on the
Puntland Maritime Police Force, the Mogadishu-based National Intelli-
gence and Security Agency (NISA), and more recently the Somali
National Army (SNA). In the latter cases, the UAE has been battling
Turkey for proxy influence in Somalia, and their foreign policy compe-
tition has accelerated Somalia’s federalisation on account of the pockets
of efficiency that have emerged. In this confrontation, Abu Dhabi has
attempted to co-opt the US into supporting its initiative as a trusted
partner that shares the same ambitions and goals.
The UAE’s involvement in Yemen has recently focused Abu Dhabi’s
attention on Somaliland. Following immediately behind DP World’s suc-
cessful 30-year concession bid to develop Berbera port and operate its
engagements, the UAE formally agreed a deal to construct a naval military
base outside of Berbera port.19 While this was later cancelled, the inten-
tion that it demonstrated – to build a wider presence within the Indian
Ocean and Horn of Africa – would have provided an ability significantly
to expand its scope of influence. DP World’s slow progress at developing
Puntland’s Bosaso port has caused discontent within the regional
administration.
While the UAE has attempted to maintain a wide level of support within
Somalia, it faces strong competition from Qatar and Turkey. Ankara has a
strong base of support within Mogadishu. However, Abu Dhabi has been
cultivating opposition parties to undermine upcoming elections and win
the state back into its sphere of heightened influence. Like Libya, the
battle over Somalia is as much about re-establishing a presence for Abu
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Dhabi as it is about ensuring the rejection of its ideological opponents
Qatar and Turkey.
Yemen
Since the Arab Spring, the UAE’s involvement within Yemen has been
focused upon its role within the Saudi-led coalition. The UAE’s focus
has been on the capturing and securing of South Yemen from Houthi
forces, and from Islamic extremists that have benefited from years of
state neglect. The ground strategy however has incorporated two
additional and unofficial objectives: the fostering of Southern cession for
its own benefit, and conflict with Islamic extremists such as AQAP and
the Yemeni branch of theMuslim Brotherhood,Al-Islah. These objectives
have been in stark contrast to those of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE has a long history in South Yemen, with the Al-Nahyan ruling
family claiming heritage in Wadi Nahyan.20 Following earlier civil wars
within Yemen, the UAE has integrated a sizeable South Yemeni diaspora,
many of whom are now officers within the Ministry of Interior (MOI).
Following the expulsion of long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a
process of de-Salehisation has been attempted to remove components of
his authority across the Yemeni state. This has been painful especially in
the security apparatus, as Saleh and his allies had long dominated this
area. The UAE has however fostered alternate security organisations to
those promoted by Saudi Arabia, further fracturing the war-torn state.
Groups include the Security Belt forces and the National Resistance.
The most prominent engagement however has been the attempted reor-
ganisation of the Political Security Office (PSO) into UAE-supported
groups, as it was the principal intelligence organisation within Yemen.
The development of Southern cession-focused security groups was
cemented after the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council
(STC), the de-facto government in South Yemen. This evolved after
years of direct relationship management by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) with Yemeni tribes and leading political
figures Aidarous al-Zubaidi and Hani bin Breik. The UAE’s engagement
in informal relations is seen in direct contrast to Saudi Arabia’s direct com-
mitment to maintaining a working relationship at a state level with the
Yemeni President Abdrubbah Hadi. This juncture was however exactly
where the Emirati-Saudi partnership in Yemen disintegrated.
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The UAE’s focus on delivering security and stability within the South saw
it confront Al-Islah, AQAP, and IS. This was legitimised by Abu Dhabi’s
strong relationship with the US in confronting terror on the Arabian
Peninsula. Through this dynamic, the UAE was able to bring Sudan
back into the GCC fold and deploy a contingent of Sudanese Janjaweed
soldiers to South Yemen to support the UAE’s objectives, thus circum-
venting Abu Dhabi’s vulnerability over its slight manpower.
This, however, became a major point of disagreement between Abu
Dhabi and Riyadh as the UAE interprets Al-Islah in the same vein as
AQAP and the IS. Al-Islah are however a strong socio-political network
within Yemen, with President Hadi and his cabinet closely aligned with
the group. This strategic split contributed to a deterioration of stability
within the South and triggered what has become a further front within
Yemen’s civil war.
The UAE has since taken a step back, having formally announced its
military withdrawal in February 2020; however, they continue to
take part in military engagements in support of the STC. The initial
tension between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has abated, thanks to the rela-
tive stability delivered by the STC and the lack of options for Riyadh.
It is however largely through the UAE’s relationship with the STC that
the Saudi-led coalition has been able to achieve a preliminary strategic
gain. Abu Dhabi’s strong relationship with the political-military leader-
ship within parts of South Yemen provides a long-term foundation
from which it can continue to generate sympathy and deliver future
political gains.
Conclusions
The Arab Spring illustrated the significant threat posed by domestic forces
in all GCC states. While the collective response initially focused on the
appeasement of these threats, many have looked to counter the regional
wave of political developments to suit their own political outlooks.
Where the states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have a not placed so
much importance in developing their coercive apparatus to deploy such
assets internationally, the UAE’s appreciation for military engagement
has seen it participate in multiple theatres.
The interpretation and application of strategic choice within the GCC’s
international relations have evidenced an evolution of foreign relations
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whereby, as a result of differing foreign policies among the GCC states,
external actors and states are gradually contributing to the re-interpret-
ation of the region’s external relations. The cohesive network between
Abu Dhabi-Riyadh-Cairo has successfully played Washington, Moscow,
and Paris for greater regional influence and has as a result been able to suc-
cessfully work towards a re-imagined post-Arab Spring vision. This has
developed from a pragmatic approach to one that is about denying an
outpost for its adversaries.
The critical deficiency in Emirati manpower has encouraged greater dip-
lomatic engagement in the Post-Arab Spring era. Combined commercial
and security ties have succeeded in developed countries, however, the
war-torn theatres of Libya, Somalia, and Yemen have required the
implementation of a multi-faceted strategic approach. Abu Dhabi’s foster-
ing of inter-personnel ties supports its political-military strategy and forms
the basis for its security-led development across MENA. The intimate
knowledge and handling of portfolios by senior Emirati figures and
their patrons indicates a long-term strategy that will continue through
either their current form or another body.
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